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Abstract
It is undeniable that religion provides a sense of purpose, ethical direction, and social belonging that most human beings
for most of recorded history have found to be profoundly important. But it is equally undeniable that its supernatural
metaphysics and dogmatic conservatism have retarded society’s progress in many ways and caused untold human suffering.
An obvious question is thus: Is it possible to preserve the beneficial aspects of religion but excise the problematic ones?
Immanuel Kant fathered the postmodern age with his devastating critique of the possibility of human knowledge of the
Ultimate. However, Kant himself was far from skeptical about the possibility of objective human knowledge - as long as
its claims were carefully qualified. The key to understanding this seeming contradiction is his (often misunderstood)
transcendental method. The method offers a way to have our postmodern skepticism concerning traditional religious supernaturalism and still eat our metaphysical cake, as it were.
Combining a transcendental approach with new scientific findings about the nature of the universe may allow us transcend the stalemate between scientific rationalism and faith, constructing a belief system which blends positive elements of
each perspective. Scientists in a number of disciplines are beginning to hypothesize that the universe naturally creates
complexity. On the one hand, this undercuts the most common justification for belief in the supernatural, since there is no
need for divine intervention to explain things that occur naturally. On the other hand, it invites those so inclined to view
themselves as part of a universal telos involving the creation of complexity. Such a move requires only the smallest step
of faith to adopt and may provide believers with the sense of purpose, ethical foundation, and social support they long for
while sidestepping conflict with the essential claims and methods of science.

Keywords Postmodern, religion, complexity, science, faith, metaphysics, transcendental

1. Introduction
Every mind must make its choice between truth
and repose. It cannot have both. – R.W. Emerson
Science and faith have a long and tempestuous relationship. There have been times when they worked harmoniously together, as during the natural theology movement that produced scientists like Newton and Darwin, but
also times when they have fought hammer and tong, as
when the Catholic Church used its coercive power to repress scientific views that threatened religious dogma.
The current situation is complex, with signs of both renewed tension and promising convergence.
Unfortunately, it’s rare for interlocutors who debate these issues in
the fora of public opinion to exhibit much appreciation for
the subtleties of the conceptual terrain – a state of affairs
that insures such exchanges produce much heat but little
light.
As a corrective to this frenetic myopia, I will first place

the relationship between science and faith within a broad
historical context by comparing the intellectual origins of
science with those of the so called postmodern worldview.
Then I will do what philosophers are often uniquely positioned to do: identify the essential contours of the conceptual forest by stepping back from the distracting details
of particular trees. This will allow us to see some ways in
which both sides have gone beyond their remits to create
unnecessary problems. After delineating a possibility
space for a “minimal faith” consistent with the essential
commitments of both sides, I then discuss the complex universe hypothesis as a concrete example of a scientific hypothesis that suggests a way to fill this space. Of course, as
with any compromise, this requires both sides to make concessions, and is thus a position guaranteed to have many
detractors. Fortunately, however, my present purpose is not
to solve the problem at one fell swoop, but simply to suggest a more fruitful direction for further conversations.

2. Historical Overview
2.1. The Scientific Revolution
The first principle is that you must not fool yourself –
and you are the easiest person to fool. – R. Feynman
It is of course impossible to do justice to the complex
religious, philosophical and scientific development of the
last 300 years in only a few paragraphs. It is with trepidation, therefore, that I attempt to trace a few of the main
themes in intellectual history that underlie the genesis and
nature of postmodern thought. I beg the reader’s indulgence with this preface however, since it is critical for understanding both the current tension between religion and
science as well as an avenue for a possible rapprochement.
We are all familiar with the standard account of the scientific revolution as the beginning of a new age of reason
and optimism following the long dark night of the Middle
Ages. For thousands of years, homage to long dead thinkers, enforced by the church, strangled independent thought.
But with the removal of these barriers, science blossomed
and, with it, our ability to provide explanations of natural
phenomena. Philosophers label this interval, stretching
from roughly the beginning of the 17th to the middle of the
19th centuries, the modern period.
This was a time characterized by an unbounded optimism
concerning our collective capacity to explain the universe
and solve our problems thereby. The familiar example of
the development of modern astronomy provides a stock
illustration of the process: Copernicus’ theory of a heliocentric solar system was initially opposed by the church, an
opposition that culminated in the infamous trial and condemnation of Galileo. But science had the last laugh, as
the heliocentric idea was taken up by new men of science
like Brahe and Kepler, then rapidly enshrined within the
powerful new paradigm of Newtonian physics. By the end
of the modern age, the church was in full retreat and science
seemed poised to solve all the mysteries of the heavens.
As science became more professionalized, it began to
pull away from natural philosophy, concentrating on empirical investigations. But the theoretical philosophers were
still part of the movement, working to provide an explanation for the success of these new methods. Initially, transitional figures like Descartes and Leibniz argued that it was
our innate rational gift, bestowed by a benevolent God and
exemplified by the elegance of mathematics, that allowed
us to uncover the truths of the natural world [1,2]. But it
was not long before a new type of empiricist began to argue
that we come to know, not through the operations of a mysterious reason, but only by careful induction applied to the
data of perception [3,4]. The new scientists quickly
adopted this empirical philosophy as the appropriate foundation of their work – a marriage that persists to this day.
2.2. The Problem of Induction
Everything should be made as simple as possible,
but not simpler. – A. Einstein
But no marriage is without its difficulties.

Though it

does an excellent job of giving voice to the empirical attitudes embraced by science, as a metaphysical doctrine, empiricism leaves much to be desired. This point was made
most persuasively in a critique of the powers of empiricism
by one of its early adopters, David Hume [5]. He uncovers what he labeled “the problem of induction,” showing
that empiricism establishes a standard of knowledge it can
not itself meet, thus revealing a fundamental contradiction
at its very foundation that has not been satisfactorily resolved to this day. The argument is relatively simple:
1. Empiricists claim we know nothing that we do not
derive from experience, a move that prevents the
importation of unjustified “knowledge” through
intuition, revelation, etc.
2. To discover truth, therefore, we must always begin
with the data of experience, and induce the regularities of nature from this. For example, we observe that an object falls to earth whenever released, so we induce that all such objects will always behave this way under similar circumstances.
In time, such observations are enshrined as “laws
of nature” and are used to make precise predictions
that can be tested. Whatever honorific you apply
to the resulting regularity, however, the logic remains inductive.
3. But causal reasoning like this requires that the
universe will continue to behave in a uniform
fashion or we would have no grounds to predict
the future based on the past. Hume called this
assumption of uniformity “the principle of induction” and observed that all causal reasoning, and
thus all empirical induction, rests on this principle.
4. But the principle of induction can’t be justified, for
to attempt an empirical justification of a principle
required for empirical justification would be patently circular. And, since the empiricist holds
that all knowledge must be generated empirically,
there is no other option.
5. The intellectually honest empiricist, therefore,
must admit that her entire system of knowledge
rests on a principle that is not only unsupported in
fact, but unsupportable in principle.
6. Since a chain of reasoning is only as strong as it
weakest link, all conclusions of empiricism (and
thus of science) are rendered highly suspect.
This puts empiricism in the epistemically awkward position of espousing a method that seems to work very well,
but in a way they can neither explain nor justify. The best
they can do is point to the fact of their success and hope that
it continues. Of course, one time-honored option in the
face of such a daunting philosophical problem is to simply
ignore it – an approach advocated by Hume himself and
imitated by the few practicing scientists aware of the dilemma. In one sense, there is nothing wrong with such a
pragmatic approach, especially given the enormous success
science has achieved using it, but at the very least the existence of this unresolved problem should engender a certain metaphysical modesty on the part of scientists.
2.3. A Cure Worse than the Disease?

Sapere aude! 'Have courage to use your own reason!'
- that is the motto of enlightenment. – I. Kant
Immanuel Kant was a philosopher who took Hume’s
challenge seriously – indeed, more seriously than Hume
himself [6]. If science is so critical to our understanding
of the universe, he reasoned, it must be possible to place it
on a firm epistemic foundation, which requires defusing the
problem of induction. And so he set out to do just this,
though whether and in what sense he succeeded in this project is still a matter of debate.
Kant accepts the empiricist idea that we have no direct
access to information about the “real” world (noumena)
beyond our mental representations (phenomena). Since
metaphysics is about the ultimate nature of reality, any empiricist making metaphysical claims is in the awkward position of using sensation as a guide to the supposedly extra-sensory causes of sensation. To make matters worse,
Kant argues persuasively that our sensation is not a passive
faculty on which the world impresses itself, but instead involves active (if subconscious) interpretation (a claim richly confirmed by modern psychology). This makes it impossible to know the nature of the world beyond our experience with any confidence – we are trapped in our own
minds, as it were. To use a simple analogy, it’s as if we
spend our entire lives locked inside a movie theatre with
only the images on the screen as a guide to the outside
world. We have no way to tell whether and to what extent
the images correspond to what’s outside. And since we
also know that our expectations and desires influence what
see on the screen, we have strong grounds to be skeptical
about any claim concerning the world beyond the theatre.
This is a radically pessimistic conclusion, to be sure, but
Kant argues that we must not deceive ourselves about our
epistemic situation or pretend it is otherwise. We can never know the true nature of the reality beyond our senses,
period. Surprisingly, though, he does not think this implies skepticism. His unique insight is that, while we can
never know anything definite about ultimate reality, we can
know something about the ways we structure its influence
on our experience. In essence, he argues that there are
certain structural properties (categories) of the experiential
world that are necessary for the function of reason. Thus,
as rational creatures, we must think the way we do.
One of the necessary features of our perceptual world are
causal relationships, a fact which allows us to justify the
principle of induction, albeit not in the way we might wish.
To put it bluntly, although we will never know whether
things like causal relationships are real, we can know that,
even if they are illusions, they are illusions that will be
shared by all other rational creatures. Casual reasoning
accurately portrays the mental worlds of all rational creatures - human, animal, alien or even divine - and this inter-subjectivity is as close to metaphysical truth as we will
ever get.
Given such an intuitively unsettling conclusion, it should
come as no surprise that opinions differ on whether this
constitutes a victory for human knowledge. Indeed, the
history of philosophy following Kant can plausibly be divided into two general camps based on reaction to his ideas.

Those who take all of Kant’s conclusions seriously go on to
found what is typically described as “analytic philosophy”,
where the goal is seen as precisely delineating what we can
and can’t know and in what ways. But those who reject
his account of our limited objectivity are put on a very pessimistic path indeed. This is the seed of postmodernism.

2.4. Postmodernism is Born
“In the consciousness of the truth he has perceived, man
now sees everywhere only the awfulness or the absurdity of
existence and loathing seizes him. – F. Nietzsche
Kant’s philosophy had an electric effect on philosophy,
catalyzing the formation of German idealism in the late 18th
century. These philosophers tried in various ways to come
to grips with what the devastating swath Kant had cut
through traditional epistemology and metaphysics [7,8].
One common approach was to simply accept our inability to
find ever find truth – in other words, to adopt a radical form
of epistemic pessimism. This sense of pessimism gained
strength in the 19th century from a complex series of social
and intellectual developments. A time of rapid social
change, the dawn of the industrial revolution saw social
upheaval that prompted many thinkers (most famously
Marx and Engels) to argue for overthrowing the old political systems. Scientific systems were also being challenged in ways that lent momentum to the pessimistic spirit
of the age. For example, the publication of Darwin’s
Origin of Species made it difficult to defend the traditional
claim that human reason was anything terribly special, since
it evolved from much simpler systems in non-human animals via a process that, if not random, at least showed no
evidence of direction or purpose. And the pointless slaughter of the great war at the beginning of the 20th century
proved the final nail in the coffin of modern optimism.
Thus grew the movement known popularly as postmodernism. It’s important to note immediately that this term
conceals more than it reveals, as there is much more diversity and nuance here than most people realize. The term
has been used to lump together a variety of distinct philosophical schools and methods (e.g., existentialism, critical
theory, deconstructionism, nihilism, etc.) as well as a number of less precise attitudes and dispositions that don’t rise
to the level of a philosophical system. Since my goal at
present is not to attempt a thorough classification of these
views, but rather to position the conflict between science
and religion within a broad intellectual trend, I will use the
term “postmodern” somewhat loosely. However one decides to apply the terminology, it is fair to say that, just as
the modern era was characterized by an unbounded optimism concerning the possibility of human knowledge and
progress, the postmodern era is marked by an extremely
pessimistic attitude towards all claims to truth, purpose and
meaning.
This creates an existential problem that is perhaps best
illustrated in Camus’ Myth of Sisyphus [9]. Sisyphus was

the mythological King of Corinth punished by the Gods for
an insufficiently reverential attitude (and in particular, an
attempt to cheat death). His punishment consisted of being forced to push a huge boulder up a hill, only to watch it
roll back down again just as he reached the top. He was
consigned to this repetitive, fruitless toil for all eternity,
without any hope of relief or illusion of purpose. For Camus, to contemplate Sisyphus’ horrific plight is to confront
the situation we all are in, even if most of us refuse to accept it for what it is. In pursuing truth without flinching,
and in particular by refusing to be lulled into the illusion of
purpose and meaning those in authority foist on the unsuspecting, the postmodern thinker dooms herself to a life of
pointless suffering and toil. She knows that she is hopelessly adrift in the sea of meaningless chaos that is our universe, and is forced to conclude that life is absurd.
This attitude, like the scientific attitude, has seeped into
our modern cultural norms in ways that are not always appreciated. Educated westerners are likely to assume, without much critical reflection, a skeptical orientation to claims
that used to be widely accepted. Thus, we are more likely
now than ever before to reject broad metaphysical claims
(e.g., religious, scientific) and remain steadfastly dubious
about the possibility of objective standards (e.g., ethical,
aesthetic). Certainly, the debate between science and religion in popular culture has been influenced by a postmodern view of intellectual exchange. Because there are no approved standards, the goal of modern “debate” (here and
elsewhere) is not a shared, if competitive, search for truth,
but rather the utter destruction of one’s opponent by any
means necessary, including rhetorical dirty tricks.
If the postmodernist is right and there really is no purpose
or point to life, we have limited options. We can:
1. Avoid the problem by ignoring it.
2. Avoid the problem by committing suicide.
3. Accept the problem and suffer.
4. Accept the problem and learn to love the absurd.
5. Accept the problem and find a non-objective
source of purpose.
The first option, while popular, is either an act of ignorance or a willful rejection of the truth. Either way, it’s not
something anyone devoted to the truth can endorse and the
postmodern philosopher (if not always the postmodernist
more generally) is just as devoted to the search for truth as
the scientist - she is just extremely skeptical about our ability to find it. Not surprisingly, the temptation to kill oneself and thus end the farce is a very common theme in
postmodern discussions. However, postmodernists have
the same basic psychological makeup as the rest of us,
which includes robust psychological mechanisms to prevent
self destruction. They thus often express a longing for
suicide as something they should do if they could only
overcome their animal natures – a position Nietzsche labels
“the most difficult thought” [10].
If we accept the postmodern problem, however, it is not
easy to deal with. We can simply suffer, of course, but
most people would reject this option out of hand. We
could learn to love the absurd – as Camus puts it, “we must
imagine Sisyphus happy.” But this is a bit like telling
someone in great pain: “It’s mind over matter – if you don’t

mind, it doesn’t matter.” While undeniably true, very few
people find such advice helpful.
Our final option is to discover a source of meaning for
ourselves. But this is not easy either. Since postmodernism undermines not only all conventional ideas of meaning
and purpose, but their sources as well (e.g., God, the state),
we are entirely on our own in the search for meaning.
Indeed, it is better to say that we are required to create
meaning rather than to discover it, since there is no privileged place where it might be found.
Some postmodern
philosophers believe this can be done – for example, by
devoting oneself to living an authentic life [11,12]. While
this is probably easier to achieve than learning to love absurdity, for our purposes it suffices to note that it is still
extremely difficult – to the point where its attainment eluded some of the greatest postmodern thinkers.
What are we to do in the face of this dilemma? There is
at least one other option not listed above – the leap to faith.
Kierkegaard [13], himself a foundational postmodern philosopher, famously argued that one must simply choose to
believe in something that provides objective meaning, despite the lack of evidence (and perhaps even in the face of
countervailing evidence). Such a leap is subjective in the
sense that is a purely personal choice without objective evidence. But it is also objective, at least in the sense that
what one subjectively believes in is a source of objective
truth.
Of course, the most common sort of leap is into some
kind of traditional religion, since this provides a complex
and ready made system of values. In principle, however, a
leap could be toward anything that allows for a sense of
objective purpose. Given the commitments underlying
postmodernism, it is not surprising that most postmodernists
consider leaping into faith to be a perversion of their ideals.
And it is certainly at least ironic to use the search for objective truth to justify what is manifestly at least an arational,
and perhaps even an irrational, belief system. But more
ironic still is the extent to which both sides of the modern
discourse between science and religious are caught in the
grip of this worldview without realizing it.

3. Science vs. Religion
Only the closed mind is certain. – D. Spanley
Of course, no thumbnail history such as this can possibly
do justice to all the complex nuances of the ideas at play
here. However, the above discussion does trace one very
important line of thought that helps explain the origins of
some of the tensions between science and religion in the
postmodern world. Now I want to put flesh on this abstract
discussion by presenting concrete examples of the two opponents in the modern debate between science and religion.
I present these as caricatures, so they are by definition exaggerations, yet readers will likely see elements of their
own thinking in one or the other position and neither is so
extreme that there aren’t real examples of each. By examining the extremes, I hope to reveal more clearly where
the opportunities for compromise lie.

3.1. The Atheist Scientist
The greatest empiricists among us are only empiricists on
reflection: when left to their instincts, they dogmatize like
infallible popes. – Wm. James
The atheist scientist is a familiar trope in the modern
world and has some influential instantiations, particularly
within the recent neo-atheist movement [14,15,16,17,18].
He sees himself as engaged in the search for truth using the
only method untainted by suspect metaphysics – science.
Like many postmodernists, he is baffled by those with the
weakness of mind to embrace comforting illusion rather
than face reality without flinching. In an act of intellectual
moralizing, he even asserts that no one deserving the label
“scientist” could be anything but a confirmed atheist. He
is confident that, with the proper education, all humanity
will eventually shed their childish need for religious myth
and the world will consequently be a much better place.
One basic problem with this attitude, of course, is that
science does not, and indeed can not, avoid unsupported
assumptions. Most scientists are not aware of this, since
they do not study the philosophical foundations of their own
discipline, but it is no less true for their lack of insight.
Even the extremely brief historical background presented
above suffices to illustrate how two assumptions were indispensible during the emergence of science as a discipline:
1. The belief that the universe is a kosmos - that is,
the kind of place that can be explained by human
reason.
2. The belief that the empirical methods of science
are adequate for uncovering the truths of this kosmos.
The notion that we live in a kosmos is so central to the
modern, scientific, worldview that people don’t often single
it out for critical scrutiny. However, it is clear that its adoption was an essential step in the creation of science. And
if we are honest, we have to admit that it is not possible to
justify this claim. There are always rumblings at the edge
of one science or another suggesting that our knowledge of
the universe is somehow fundamentally flawed. The recent discovery of dark matter and energy, whose existence
was not even suspected 50 years ago, is a case in point: it is
becoming increasingly clear that these are actually the
dominant forces in our universe, yet we have scarcely begun to understand them [19,20]. But debates about the
scientific anomaly du jour aside, it’s important to realize
that we will never disprove the possibility that all of our
scientific knowledge is actually false in a systematic fashion. For example, some respectable philosophers and scientists have given a modern twist to Kant’s conclusion
about ultimate reality by suggesting the entire universe may
be merely a simulation [21,22,23,24]. This implies that
anything we discover about what we call “the universe,” no
matter how well supported by empirical evidence, may not
be about anything real at all.
The notion that empiricism suffices to explain natural
phenomena is more problematic still. Hume’s problem of
induction has never been resolved in a way that would make
a confirmed empiricist happy. There are thus excellent

theoretical reasons to be suspicious of any empirical system
that attempts to bootstrap its own justification. But the
dream of a complete empirical system is so seductive that a
generation of philosophers of science (the logical positivists)
in the first half of the 20th century tried valiantly to delineate precisely how empirical evidence can support scientific
claims using elaborate systems of logic [25,26]. Unfortunately, this failed rather spectacularly when these attempts
actually established that such an account is not logically
possible [27,28].
The atheist scientist also makes problematic assumptions
about the nature of religion. Typically, the characteristics
of the crudest sorts of religious beliefs – those that tend to
conflict directly with science, for example – are taken to be
representative of all religions.
Thus, the view espoused
by young earth creationists that the universe is only a few
thousand years old is held up as an example of the evils of
religion, despite the fact that there are large segments of
traditional religions (including a clear majority of Christians)
that oppose such silliness [29,30]. More subtly, atheists
who wish to attack religion typically assume that to be religious is to believe in a divine being, and in particular one
who uses his supernatural powers to intervene in the natural
world. While there are many who believe precisely this,
not all religions require belief in God(s) at all (e.g., Taoism,
Buddhism) and many theologians within monotheistic traditions have proposed interpretations of divinity which
avoid supernatural claims [31,32,33]. It has even been
proposed that certain types of religious claims may be scientifically testable (if perhaps unlikely to be true) [34,35].
Therefore, the atheist should object, not to religion in general, but to certain (admittedly common) types of religious
belief.
Certainly the sad state of scientific literacy in countries
like the United States is often (rightly) blamed for much of
the tension between science and religion [36,37]. However, the assumption that quality science education will naturally convince people to abandon their religious commitments seems at least highly questionable. Increasingly,
scientific investigation into how people actually form opinions reveals that the kinds of abstract reasoning scientists
and philosophers laud plays a relatively small role [38,39].
This suggests that most people may never be able to participate sufficiently in the scientific enterprise to be able to use
it as the sole source of meaning and purpose. If that’s the
case, presenting the choice as starkly as the atheist scientist
does will actually be counterproductive, since forces the
average believer to choose between the mysterious authority of a religion that plays an important role in their life and
the mysterious authority of a science from which they derive no comfort. Given such a choice, should we really be
surprised when most prefer religion, in whatever form it is
offered?
In one sense, the scientist’s refusal to countenance any
claim that can’t be rationally justified is critically important,
since it’s far too easy to fool oneself. Yet this narrow focus must be focused narrowly – on the explanations one is
willing to entertain to explain natural phenomena, not on all
explanations that could be put forward, even if they are only
tangentially relevant to the practice of science. If a faith

claim neither impinges on the details of natural explanation
nor gets in the way of naturalistic methodology in general,
science should ignore it. Consider the case of creationism:
some creationists believe things that directly conflict with
science (e.g., a young Earth). Science is obliged to vigorously oppose such claims, since they directly conflict with
extremely well supported science. On the other hand, many
people will call themselves creationists yet, when pressed to
clarify, simply claim that the universe, with all its natural
processes (including evolution), was created by a divine
being. There is no scientific need to debate such a claim
and the atheist scientist who chooses to do so is therefore
not operating as a scientist, but as someone with his own,
extra-scientific, worldview. That is certainly his right, but
he can’t legitimately claim that the authority of science
supports such a move.
And it’s quite obvious that human needs are richer and
more diverse than simply explaining the natural world – the
persistence of religion and other extra-scientific means of
avoiding postmodern angst establish this beyond much
doubt. Creating worldviews that allow people to be happy
and fulfilled may not be science’s concern, but that makes it
no less a fundamental human need. Indeed, science seems
to realize this in practice if not explicitly, as it is often
thought to be an important part of the mission of science to
create a sense of wonder concerning the natural world
[40,41,42]. What’s more, it seems unlikely this is a need
that will ever be adequately met by science alone. That
does not mean that everyone needs an extra-scientific belief
system, of course – some individuals may be perfectly content with science alone, just as some postmodernists may be
able to create their own personal sense of meaning. But
this misses the crucial point that many, perhaps most, people will simply not be able to do this. A science that continues to push an all or nothing approach to leaps of faith, is
creating its own enemy - and needlessly so.
Thus, the thoughtful scientist must be careful to defend
science only where a defense is truly necessary. True,
science provides no reason to believe in the existence of
divine beings and this is an important point. But this is not
the same as providing evidence that such a being does not
exist. The scientific method is a heuristic for investigating
the natural world, not a complete guide to the nature of reality, at least not in any direct way. The scientist is thus
well within her rights to oppose a specific religious claim
that conflicts with scientific evidence, or to highlight the
lack of evidence for religious claims in general, or to warn
about the indirect threat that supernatural beliefs can pose to
scientific methods. But true atheism requires one to go
beyond the available evidence and make a leap of faith of
one’s own.
3.2. The Man of Unshakable Faith
Men think epilepsy divine, merely because they do not
understand it. But if they called everything which they
do not understand divine, why, there would be no end
to divine things. - Hippocrates
The man of unshakeable faith is one who believes in a
traditional monotheistic religion like Christianity based on a

(relatively) literal reading of ancient texts. He has no patience for fancy modern theology and believes in a personal
God who loves him in a direct way and intervenes in the
natural world through miracles. He is eager to use his
rational powers when they support his faith, but quick to lay
them aside when they prove inconvenient – indeed, he immediately rejects any claim inconsistent with his own interpretation of scripture, regardless of the weight of evidence
behind it. He believes the world would be a much better
place if others felt as he does and is in favor of a public
educational system specifically crafted to bring this about.
Finally, he believes science is ultimately just another type of
faith - on a par, in some ultimate epistemic sense, with religion. Examples of such people are commonplace, but an
especially rich vein can be found within the creationist
movement [43,44,45].
One obvious problem here is the origins of this sort of
belief. It is an inescapable fact that the vast majority of
the world’s major religions were created by illiterate peasants living in a pre-scientific age. The founders of these
religions were profoundly ignorant of the sorts of truths we
now expect all children to master at an early age. Therefore, whatever insights religions may contain, they are an
exceptionally poor guide to the workings of the natural
world. No position we choose to stake out should get in
the way of our ability to understand the natural world, since
this understanding is critical to solving the world’s problems. And since science is clearly the best mechanism
anyone has ever devised for this purpose, no religion should
set itself against science. In fact, doing so is actually a
threat to religion, since it picks a fight with science that it
will ultimately lose – a point made quite persuasively by the
head of the U.S. National Institutes of Health and evangelical Christian, Francis Collins [46].
The problem is not the use of ancient texts per se, it’s the
way the faith claims they embody are accepted without reflection. This may seem an odd thing to say – isn’t the
whole nature of a leap of faith to accept a claim without
adequate empirical evidence? Yes, but that does not absolve believers of their responsibility to carefully consider
the context of each leap of faith before making it. It’s one
thing to carefully consider one’s epistemic situation and
reluctantly decide that a leap is the only option, and quite
another to use such a leap as a cheap way to “justify” what
you want to believe without the hard work of critical reflection. Too many believers today approach faith claims far
too casually, which does not do justice to the seriousness of
the issues at stake.
And it’s not enough to assess the leaps before they are
made. Since we live in a world that is constantly changing,
our leaps must be periodically reassessed in light of new
circumstance. Communities of faith thus need to create
robust and ongoing internal cultures of critique. Of course,
some faiths already do this in limited ways, and whatever
internal systems are or are not in place, religious interpretations do evolve in response to changes in the world around
them [16,47]. If this didn’t happen, religions would die.
But many followers of traditional religions are not taught to
cherish critique as a healthy part of religion and those so
inclined to critique tend to have little access to processes for

impacting official doctrine. Adherence to ancient texts
exacerbates the problem, since followers must still regard
the texts as sacred and true even as interpretations change,
creating ineliminable tensions. All too often, change
comes to religions only fitfully and with great confusion
and pain.
The lack of a systematic critical culture within religion is
a large part of the reason science is opposed to faith. The
fact that some believers have a sensible approach to scientific truths does not mean that most do. And even the sensible believers don’t always feel a strong responsibility to
chastise others who take their faith claims too far. But
they must, since adopting a belief of any kind is an exercise
with moral implications [48] and leaps of faith, being divorced from the need for evidence, are fertile grounds for
dangerous abuse. Religions should therefore explicitly
recognize this fact and adopt a collective duty on the part of
believers to limit the scope of faith claims. To give just
one of many possible examples, if moderate Islamic voices
do not take an explicit stance against Islamic radicalism,
they are to some extent tacitly endorsing jihad as a legitimate expression of faith. This is fundamentally different
from the culture of science, where constant critique is an
integral part of the process. Scientists would thus have a
much easier time accepting leaps of faith if religions were
more active in policing their ranks for overzealous applications of faith.
People, particularly those influenced by intelligent design
creationism, often point out that science involves unsupportable metaphysical claims such an ontological naturalism.
I will not respond to that claim specifically, except to note
that it has been decisively refuted elsewhere [49]. Whatever the merits of the claim, it illustrates that there is a
sense among many believers that science is “just another
faith tradition.” There is some truth here, of course, since
as we discussed previously, science does make leaps of faith.
However, not all leaps of faith are created equal. The assumptions science makes are the minimal ones that must be
made in order to pursue rational investigation of the world.
We can reject them if we wish, but the result will be a mysterious universe we can not, in principle, explain. Religions, on the other hand, do not typically adopt a minimalist
approach to leaps of faith. Indeed, they often embrace, not
just arational, but irrational revelation, and this is a very
different matter.
In particular, most traditional religions embrace supernaturalism - where one believes in forces and entities that,
by definition, flout our scientific understanding of the natural world. This is not something science can countenance.
It’s not that science can establish such claims are false – it
can’t - but rather that any methodology which accepts supernatural claims is antithetical to the scientific process.
To accept the existence of something that can not, in principle, be explained thru human reason, is to open Pandora’s
box. We lose all control over what emerges, since believing in supernatural entities is like embracing a contradiction
in logic – once you make this move, you can use it to “establish” anything at all, no matter how contrary to reason.
The real tension between science and religion lies here,
since no one committed to the concept of a kosmos can ac-

cept such a move. Of course, in principle, it is possible to
endorse a certain kind of supernatural claim without hindering science – for example, that God works his will only
indirectly, with the natural universe as his instrument. But
history seems to show that, once such a power is asserted,
metaphysical claims multiply in a way that will eventually
pose problems for the rational investigation of the natural
order.
Thus, to the extent that supernaturalism is an ineliminable aspect of religion, science is justified in rejecting a
broad compromise. However, as we’ve discussed, supernaturalism is not a necessary part of religion, even of traditional monotheistic religions. When the atheist scientist fails
to appreciate the diversity of religion on this point, his ignorance is revealed. On the other hand, the fact that so
few religious believers appreciate this point themselves
makes the scientist’s mistake more understandable.
3.3. A Metaphysical Opportunity
One should keep an open mind – but not so open that
one’s brains fall out. - Bertrand Russell
I present the two sides of the science v. religion debate as
caricatures so that we may more easily see some of the essential differences. Science is by far the best method humans beings have ever discovered for understanding the
natural world, with a track record far superior (to put it
mildly) to revelation in this regard. It is thus entirely appropriate that scientists refuse to adopt any belief which
weakens science, either by directly refuting specific scientific claims or by putting forward a way of thinking antithetical to scientific methods. But in their zeal to defend
science, they sometimes lose sight of the fact that science is
simply a heuristic based on its own unsupportable assumptions. This need not be a problem – indeed, the tentative
nature of scientific claims is one of science’s great strengths,
since it facilitates a strong culture of critique. It only becomes a problem if scientists are incautious about the scope
of the metaphysical claims they make, as in the case of the
atheist scientist.
Religion is a social phenomenon that constituted a critical
aspect of the lives of most humans beings since before the
beginning of recorded history. It stretches credibility beyond the breaking point to suggest either that this is not an
essential aspect of human nature or that nothing of value
can be found within the rich creations humans have
wrought in its name.
But to avoid essential conflict with
science, religion must also moderate its metaphysical claims.
At the very least, it must openly embrace a more open and
critical internal culture as well as eschew supernaturalism in
any form that would undermine the scientific investigation
of the natural world.
Wouldn’t it be nice if we could have our metaphysical
cake and eat it too? If we could, on the one hand, retain
the scientific worldview with its unprecedented ability to
explain the nature world, while on the other hand adopt a
wider perspective which allows us to believe our lives have
purpose and meaning of the sort religions historically have
provided. Perhaps this is something we should actively
seek.

4. The Complex Universe
And as natural selection works solely by and for the good of
each being, all corporeal and mental endowments will tend
to progress towards perfection. – C. Darwin
There is a growing movement within science that may
offer a possible compromise along these lines. It spans a
number of disciplines, from physics to chemistry to information science, and there is not yet even a shared vocabulary, so it goes by various names (e.g., the epic of evolution,
big history, cosmic evolution). The basic idea, however, is
that the universe has a structure which naturally manifests
increasing levels of complexity over time through an evolutionary process. It’s beyond the scope of this paper to argue for this position in detail, so below I will only trace the
general outlines.
Of course, the idea that the universe is progressive is
nothing new. But previous discussions have been hobbled
by non-natural metaphysical commitments and anthropocentrism, among other things. Yet increasingly, scientists
are using rigorous scientific techniques to model the universe in general, and life in particular, as a system that
spontaneously produces complexity [50,51,52,53,54]. A
proposed candidate for the first biological law ever discovered has even arisen that predicts increasing complexity as a
fundamental property of all evolving organisms [55]. Together, these suggest that it may be possible to view the
universe as exhibiting a purpose, in some sense of that term,
without the baggage that has been associated with this idea
in the past.
It’s not just that the universe gets more complex, it’s that
it manifests a series of processes that are increasingly adept
at creating complexity, generating powerful feedback.
Thus, the rate at which complexity is generated seems to be
increasing as well, particularly once the ability to produce
cultural information comes on the scene [56,57,58,59].
The universe has evolved from a smear of energy and simple matter only a cosmologist could find interesting to a
place populated by at least one species capable of contemplating its place in the universe. Stars formed in a universe
of hydrogen and began manufacturing heavier elements.
Over time, these elements formed planets where ever more
complex chemical interactions became possible. Eventually, a complexity threshold was passed and living systems
arose, enabling the new dynamic of evolution by natural
selection, increasing the rate of complexification exponentially. These life forms passed through a series of major
transitions (e.g., eukaryotes, multicellularity), with more
capacity to generate novelty at each level, until some organisms develop the mental capacity to make sociality, reason and culture possible [60,61]. The resulting cultural
evolution creates science and other rational disciplines,
within which the evolution of ideas increases the rate of
complexification even further.
The complex universe hypothesis holds that someone
with sufficient knowledge of the scientific principles and
the initial conditions could have predicted, moments after
the big bang, that a universe populated by stars, planets, and
complex chemistry would come into being. He could also

predict the evolution of living organisms, the emergence of
intelligence, and the rise of cultural systems. If this hypothesis is correct, it means that the universe produces the
kinds of complexity we see all around us, including our
scientific culture, in a perfectly natural fashion. Intuitively,
we feel that complexity requires some kind of directive plan,
implying a rational designer – a point the proponents of
intelligent design creationism make much of [62,63]. But
if the complex universe hypothesis is correct, there is no
more need to postulate supernatural forces to explain our
existence than to explain the formation of crystals forming
in a supersaturated solution – under the right conditions,
these things happen spontaneously.
We do need to be clear about what this hypothesis is not
saying. The claim is not that the universe is deterministic,
just that it is sufficiently predictable that some major trends
can be predicted with confidence. This is similar to the
way in which, although quantum phenomena are thought to
be intrinsically random at the level of individual events, it is
nevertheless possible to predict the behavior of large aggregates of such events with enormous (indeed, unprecedented) precision. Biological evolution is actually a process
fueled by random variation, so it is only possible to predict
events that are probable in the aggregate, despite random
variation in particular cases. It would therefore be absurd
to claim that the universe was destined to produce humans
if by “human” we mean something with all the peculiarities
of biology and culture that we possess. The patterns of
evolution are predictable only in their broadest strokes –
given the right conditions, we can predict that life will
probably evolve, become multicellular, develop sociality
and reason, etc. But we can’t typically predict which species will develop which type of trait in which form at which
point in time. And we certainly could not predict, 10 seconds after the big bang, that a species of hairy, intelligent
ape with arms and legs would arise on the third planet orbiting Sol, much less that one of them would one day write
a paper for the American Journal of Sociological Research
discussing the predictive limits of the complex universe
hypothesis.
We do not yet know whether this hypothesis is true.
What we can say right now is that it is broadly consistent
with what our best science tells us about the universe. It
also seems an empirically tractable question we will one
day resolve – for example, when we have much better data
about the distribution of life in the universe and the systematic principles governing its evolution. In other words, it’s
a legitimate scientific hypothesis on which we do not yet
have definitive data. I will thus leave the empirical debate
to future scientists.
But what would the extra scientific implications be
should this trend be confirmed? We could, as the atheist
scientist will urge, view it as a brute fact that is not in need
of further explanation. But doing this creates two sorts of
problems, one scientific and one extra scientific. First, when
science adopts the notion of a kosmos, it accepts the mission of explaining the universe. Generally speaking, we
think that to explain something is to show how it is at least
more likely than not to occur [64]. A view of the essential
nature of the universe as either mysterious or the result of

pure happenstance is thus at the very least less than ideal.
It’s not that there is anything inconsistent about this idea –
there isn’t – it’s just that this undermines the concept of a
kosmos on which science is built, suggesting that at some
level the universe is simply not explicable via human reason.
Second, it is difficult to see how we could derive any sense
of meaning or purpose from an accident of history. Indeed,
this difficulty may go a long way towards explaining why
humans beings created theistic religions in the first place,
since these allow us to believe that the universe has a structure in which we have a meaningful place, despite our profound ignorance of its details. We have seen how a sense
of meaning and purpose is something humans need deeply
and will pursue vigorously regardless of what science says.
Thus, in the same way it’s a mistake for religions to hinder
the investigation of the natural world when they can avoid it,
it’s also a mistake for science to create needless conflict
between that investigation and the search for meaning.
What is the alternative to traditional accounts of religion then? One possibility is to imbue the complexity
trend with value, which is not so much a fact about the universe as a choice about how we wish to view ourselves in
relation to the facts we have. Just as science is careful to
make only the minimal assumptions necessary to allow for
the possibility of rational inquiry, here we need to adopt a
minimal set of attitudes necessary to derive meaning from
the universe science reveals to us. This seems to require
two fundamental elements:
1. A deep appreciation, perhaps even a reverence, for
the universal nature of this trend (in space, in time,
in the levels of reality it encompasses, etc.).
Some view this kind of association with a reality
that transcends our own personal (and even humanity’s collective) interests as the very essence of
religion [65,66].
2. The notion that complexity is a good in the sense
that it is something we should both value and foster. It is difficult to see how we could derive a
robust sense of meaning and purpose from the
mere universality of a natural property. For example, we are all massive objects subject to gravity.
One can certainly appreciate the universality of
this claim, but by itself this does little to assuage a
postmodern sense of purposelessness.
To some extent, these ideas take us into the realms of
religion and ethics where many a scientist fears to tread.
Certainly these are not areas amenable to empirical investigation in the same way scientific questions are, and when
scientists do venture into this territory they sometime do so
in an unfortunately naïve fashion. But it’s also important
to realize that scientists already make this sort of move routinely, whether they realize it or not as it’s (fortunately) a
rare scientist who would argue that there are no moral
goods, even if they may see these most clearly in the epistemic virtues of their discipline.
But neither claim is entirely divorced from science and
its empirical techniques either. We should not build a
sense of meaning on something that does not actually exist,
and the existence of a complexity trend in an open empirical
question (if a difficult one to resolve at present). And if a

trend does exist, the details of its structure and function may
help us specify precisely what it is we should be reverent of.
Similarly, if we are going to be thoroughly naturalistic in
our approach, refusing to engage in supernaturalism, then
we need to think carefully about whether and to what extent
we can enrich the traditional discussion of moral values
with empirical knowledge. Ethical theorists tend to want
to draw a line in the sand between ethics and the empirical
world, but if we view ethics as another aspect of a purely
natural complexity trend, then there is surely much that
fields like psychology, sociology, evolution and even economics can contribute to our moral understanding – as recent explorations have suggested [67,68,69].
This kind of approach is certainly not new, even if explicit discussion of its dynamics are rare. It may be that
that the complex universe hypothesis is just one of a family
of attempts to derive meaning from a purely natural universe that are gaining ground in the popular imagination.
For example, deep ecology attempts to combine an appreciation for the universality of complex ecological relationships with the view that this complex ecological system has
value (and even rights) we are obligated to respect
[70,71,72,73]. There thus may be any number of ways to
realize this kind of minimal leap of faith other than the
complexity trend hypothesis.
Such pluralism might seem to undercut any claim to objective truth, but this conclusion would be hasty. Just as
we can predict the broad contours of an evolutionary trajectory but not its details, the fact that variants of the same
basic approach are emerging could indicate an important
convergence. It may thus be a common feature of the
evolution of social/cultural/rational beings that they begin
with a supernatural conception of the universe and their
place in it, only to abandon this is favor of more minimal
leaps of faith under the influence of scientific culture. It
could even be that some specific features of the ethical orientation of all rational creatures, wherever they emerge in
the universe, are shared [59]. There is thus the possibility
that these beliefs, even if they are subjective and contingent
in some ways, are also objective (or at last inter-subjective)
in others. If so, this would allows us to offer a response to
the postmodern dilemma similar to what Kant offered in
response to the problem of induction: if such beliefs are
universal features of all beings with the rational capacity to
contemplate such matters, then we will at least never lose a
debate concerning their truth, since all creatures capable of
joining the conversation will agree.

5. Conclusion
Before I came here I was confused about this subject.
Having listened to your lecture I am still confused,
but on a higher level. – E. Fermi
The current standoff between science and religion owes
much to the history of ideas, and in particular the postmodern movement, though in ways few of the interlocutors are
consciously aware of. Modern science tends to borrow
from postmodernism a deep skepticism about the possibility

of any ultimate truths, especially as put forward by traditional authority structures like the church. Like Hume
before them, scientists don’t worry too much about their
own metaphysical assumptions. This would be less of a
problem if they were at least aware of the difficulties, however, as it might make them more cautious in their opposition to leaps of faith in general. By way of contrast, postmodern philosophers are at least keenly aware of the psychological dilemma created by rejecting all sources of
meaning as well as the extreme difficulty of filling this void
without the traditional guarantors of objectivity. For their
part, religions tend to embrace the postmodern leap of faith
too fully, using the fact that something is a faith claim to
insulate all aspects of faith from critical scrutiny, opening
Pandora’s box to release a bewildering, and sometimes
dangerous, array of beliefs. It seems as if all parties to the
debate are talking past each other in important ways, preventing what most might view as a desirable compromise.
How can we break this stalemate?
Those with a scientific worldview must begin to seriously
consider the possibility that a minimal step of faith (as opposed to a leap) can be taken in ways that enrich rather than
hinder the efforts of science to make sense of the universe.
Stepping into the a minimalist kind of faith may actually
help preserve our dedication to rational inquiry while allowing us to reap the psychological benefits of meaning and
purpose science alone can not provide.
But the fact that there is a place for faith does not mean
that all faiths are beyond critique. Those coming from
traditional faith perspectives must embrace a far more critical attitude towards faith claims and, in particular, strive to
purge themselves of the sort of supernaturalism that no one
dedicated to rational explanation can countenance. And it
is critical that this go beyond paying mere lip service to an
abstract ideal – religions need to actively encourage their
followers to critique elements of faith as circumstances
change, providing concrete structures and processes to allow faith traditions to evolve more rapidly.
I put forward the complex universe hypothesis as an example of a scientific hypothesis capable of supporting a
minimal step of faith that could help bridge the gap between
the faith and science communities. While it is not science’s job to develop extra scientific claims that would allow us to find meaning and purpose, there’s also nothing
about such a move that science need oppose. This approach simply adds a psychological dimension to our existing scientific understanding of the universe. It explains
why we exist in a big sense – we are neither accidents of an
uncaring universe nor products of an intelligent designer,
but instead integral parts of a universal process that transcends our own existence. Viewing the creation of complexity in a purposeful way doesn’t so much change the
facts we believe in as change our attitude towards them.
Of course, even if we enthusiastically embrace meaningful universal complexity, it will not answer all questions.
People will continue to wonder why the universe has this
character of complexification, and one possible answer is to
insert the will of a supernatural creator. But this is not a
problem unique to this worldview, since it’s a move that can
be made in response to any worldview, even that of the

“hardest” science [74,75,76]. The important point is that
there is nothing intrinsic to the complex universe system
that requires a supernatural explanation.
To inject a pessimistic note, it must be allowed that this
proposal may ultimately be unworkable. Traditional religions may be too wed to supernaturalism to change their
ways fundamentally. What’s much worse is the possibility
that most people may continue to prefer the simple answers
to complex questions such systems provide, in which case
any alternative along the lines I propose here will have a
very limited following. I can only hope that I have identified a logical space in which a compromise could occur – it
remains to be seen whether anyone will actually occupy it
and how comfortable its accommodations will prove to be.
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